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Sociopolitical Stresses and the RMA
FRANK J. STECH

From Parameters, Summer 1995, pp. 47-54.
"So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past."
-- F. Scott Fitzgerald The Great Gatsby
Three sociopolitical forces are smashing each other and shaking the foundations of military affairs.
The fission of nation-states (and their armies) into complex multiples, often mired in multi-sided civil or tribal
wars that erect political barriers, sear landscapes with hatreds, and "cleanse" whole populations;
The surging quest for religious and community values that attack liberal political structures and supplant state
power, often clouding the political atmosphere with eruptions of fundamentalist propaganda;
The consolidation of the world's media organs into narrowly focused, increasingly powerful corporate
conglomerates, flooding us with observations while restricting our perspectives on the issues that matter.
Economic imperatives force the media to streamline explanations of consequences and to market simplified
myths, rumors, and misperceptions over the back fences of the global village.
Much of the growing dissatisfaction with analyses of the revolution in military affairs (RMA) stems from the
realization that the foundations of military affairs are shaking, with little understanding why that is so or what to do
about the situation.[1]
The Explosion of Nation States
Samuel Huntington described the pattern of democracy-building in the 20th century: three waves that added more
democracies, each wave followed by ethno-nationalistic reversion to non-democratic governments, often military
dictatorships.[2] While each wave added more democracies, each reversal resulted in a smaller number of back-sliding
governments than the last. These waves gradually increased the number of democratic governments. That was until
nation-states began to fission. Estimates of the number of possible new countries range from another 200 by the year
2000 to as many as a thousand in the next few decades.[3] As the third wave of ethno-nationalism divides existing
states, yet another backlash of anti-democratic regimes is likely to follow. There are many implications for military
affairs in the shift from nationalism to ethnic tribalism:
Indirect and nonlinear conflict dominates our planning and operations. Boundaries mean little to tribes which
claim ancestral geographical rights, or are willing to "ethnically cleanse" to "purify" their claimed territories.
Nonlinear tactics and special and unconventional forces are required. Front lines, centers of mass, and critical
targets may be few; close-in small-unit infantry fighting will predominate rather than air-land, armor-artillery,
mechanized warfare; military operations may be executed largely through terror and criminality; and tribal
fighters may be distinguished by no more than the green bandannas of the Chechen rebels.
Operations other than war (OOTW) are on the increase. Peace- keeping, peacemaking, border patrolling, law
enforcement assistance, refugee management, and humanitarian assistance have gained the status of "real
operations" in the latest US doctrine.
There will be a premium on intelligence--particularly information about groups, leaders, motives, traditions,
institutions, cultures, languages, and histories.
Armies and conflict will be increasingly civilianized through increased reliance on reserves and militias, and
through heavy involvement with nongovernmental organizations in humanitarian and crisis-response operations.
Inter-ethnic violence also will be civilianized; children and grandmothers are the fighting reserves of tribal

militias.
Ethnic conflict also puts political constraints on military intervention. Examples of such constraints include lack of
public or congressional support, no quick military outcomes, no clear end state, lack of allied cohesion, weak UN goals
and mandates, the need to minimize civilian casualties and damage, media coverage, and "global transparency."[4]
Technology may help the military profession to cope with tribal conflicts amidst the collapse of nation-states, but
technology has little effect on the root causes of tribal warfare.
Communitarianism and the Values Revolution
Technology plays even less of a role in explaining the second destabilizing feature of our world: the quest for values,
rooted in ethnology, regionalism, religion, and other fundamentalisms.[5] This quest generates what Samuel
Huntington termed "the clash of civilizations."[6] The quest for values, while virtuous in many dimensions, also tends
to attack liberal values and supplant state power, civics, and citizenship. "The faith of the Enlightenment in the
inevitable triumph of human reason and liberty," wrote Almond and Verba in The Civic Culture, "has been twice
shaken in recent decades."[7] This "faith" in the reason and science of the Enlightenment is under broad attack again,
not by fascists and communists this time, but by intellectuals, ranging from fundamentalist Islamic mullahs to liberals
such as Vaclav Havel and conservatives such as William Bennett. Fewer every day seem prepared to make Descartes'
declaration that identity depends solely on pure reason. Fascism and communism challenged the "inevitability of
democracy" in this century; challenges in the next century will be based on values, not ideologies.
But if communitarianism (the devolution of power to groups and the seizing of authority from the nation-state by
communities) seems good for established democracies, those same democracies seem unwilling to grant that such
actions may be good for ethnic groups and tribal enclaves, for Yugoslavia or Chechnya. "We should stop touting order
imposed from the center for others," wrote William Safire recently, "even as we come to reject that course for
ourselves. On the contrary, we should encourage others to go with the flow of centrifugal political forces all over the
world."[8] Many would reject Safire's "go with the flow" perspective, seeing that communitarianism's ideals conflict
with the core democratic political precepts which sharply limit the claims of state, government, and community on the
individual. There are no assurances that all communities will share the same values, that different groups will concur on
moralities and responsibilities, that all citizens will obey the same authorities. Wrote French journalist Jean Daniel,
"America is wondering if its citizens have less in common than they have differences. . . . [T]hey all come together not
under the banner of assimilation or oneness, but of coexistence . . . . This tendency toward `communitarianism' is as
alarming for Europe as it is for the United States. We can see in Lebanon and the former Yugoslavia where this kind
of convulsion leads."[9]
Western nations may continue to defend liberal political values (human rights, democratic processes, free speech),
even as their citizens shift to more communitarian motives for political actions (community rights, moral processes,
socially conscious speech), devolve more political power to communities, and find their armies becoming more
exclusive enclaves of a warrior spirit. Such spirit stands good stead for traditional offensive and defensive military
missions. It is less clear, though, how well "warriors" will perform in the "operations other than war" that represent
much of the future work of Western military forces. If the citizenry question the political foundations of these
operations, their military execution will become that much more difficult to sustain, regardless of the depth of warrior
spirit or professionalism in the armed forces. And pitted against these Western defenders of liberal political values
(perhaps only feebly supported by communitarian voters) will be the warriors of nations and ethnic groups that
implacably hold tribal and fundamental values. OOTW seem far better served by a professional ethic than by a warrior
spirit.
These concerns are very like the worrisome problems the Founding Fathers debated in the Federalist Papers and at the
Constitutional Convention, concerns that prompted a Bill of Rights and state militias and the avoidance of standing
armies to protect individuals from the tyrannies of majorities and from oppression by communities of warriors.
America and the world are on the threshold of a political revolution, which the communitarian values movement may
portend. The military must be ready to have these worrisome problems raised, addressed, and resolved again; we must
reflect and decide (or have decided for us): how much warrior, how much professional?

Cyclopean Viewpoints
Despite the conventional wisdom, there has been a dramatic narrowing of media viewpoints and perspectives even as
the markets for news and communications and the mechanisms to satisfy demand grow exponentially. These trends are
likely to continue: booming markets demanding more news and information, with fewer corporate organizations to
supply it. In a sort of media hydraulics, as this growing volume is forced into narrower channels, news velocity greatly
increases. The news volume hits us harder each day, preventing us from perceiving the growing homogeneity of the
torrent of words and images.
The corporations that operate world information media are increasingly integrated and consolidated in what Katherine
Fulton, founding editor of The North Carolina Independent, called a "frenzy of media mergers."[10] The mergers
reduce the dimensions and narrow the perspectives of these perceptions, even as the media are blossoming with new
technologies of delivery. "The economics of mass communication do not promote diversity [of ideas]," wrote Fletcher
School media expert Russ Neuman, noting:
a curiously powerful centripetal force in the marketplace of ideas that leads to . . . "excessive sameness" . .
. . [T]he powerful market dynamics that reinforce homogeneity pose a significant threat to the democratic
ideal of pluralism and diversity . . . . [W]hat most people hear and see in the mass media is remarkably
uniform in content and world view . . . not the result of a nefarious ring of scheming conspirators; it is
structural. It derives from . . . the marketplace.[11]
World mass media are increasingly becoming privately owned (rather than government operated), less regulated, and
more profitable. These political-economic characteristics tend to increase concentration of media products, formats,
markets, and firms. Additionally, various forms of information transmission and communication are being integrated
technically and commercially; telecommunications are becoming conduits for mass media, while mass media are
becoming interactive, i.e., telecommunications media.[12] These concentrations and integrations provide an
increasingly powerful focus on the consequences of the collapse of nation-states and the rise of values, but with a
cyclopean rather than a stereoscopic vision. The danger is that we can only see where there is light, and cannot light
what we must see.
The 1970s saw increased concern over the concentration of media outlets by a shrinking number of Western
conglomerates, culminating in the 1980 MacBride Report and UNESCO's call for a "new world information order" to
reduce "cultural domination" by Western media ownership.[13] One Third World media critic declared "the flagrant
quantitative and qualitative imbalance [in North-South communications] was nothing less than a violation of national
territories and private homes, a veritable form of mental rape."[14] These concerns did little to slow trends toward
consolidation, particularly in the United States. In 1981 there were 46 dominant US companies producing newspapers,
magazines, television and radio broadcasts, and motion pictures. By 1988, seven years later, there were only 23.[15]
The head of Turner Broadcasting predicts a future with perhaps three English-language global news networks, with
other networks in French, Japanese, and possibly Arabic. Turner is trying "to take a 30-40 percent interest in each of
these, help set it up and operate it, and at the same time make each one a news supplier to the others, thus lowering
news-gathering costs."[16]
If political leaders can find fewer viewpoints and perspectives in the news media to inform their judgments, they
increasingly feel the heat of those focused perspectives. Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres pointed to the central
role played by the information media:
The media and the public judgment [they bring] to bear on governments and leaders [have] become an
increasingly critical force in diplomacy between states and in negotiations among parties at conflict. The
greatest change in our time has not been effected by armies or states or international organizations; it has
been driven by the spread of information.[17]
Daniel Boorstin, former Librarian of Congress, observed how television can shape the culture underlying politics as
well (as any viewer of tele-evangelism can attest): "Television has offered us new avenues to community.
Democracies are very weak in ritual . . . so there is a tendency for the media to fill the gap."[18]

Historian David Jablonsky observed, "In the age of CNN, future wars and OOTW will occur in real time for both the
American people and their policymakers." The potency of the "CNN effect" on policies and political action has
reached the point that analysts are now at pains to observe that not every policy move is taken with an eye on the CNN
feed from Atlanta.[19] But when observers label CNN "the office intercom of global elites," reaction cannot be far
behind. Media analyst Nik Gowing argues (with somewhat lame relief) that "the influence of TV news on foreign
policy is not as profound as the conventional wisdom holds . . . . [I]nstantaneous TV images . . . may well induce
policy panic [or] affect a government's tactics . . . but they rarely affect strategy."[20] CNN-induced "policy panics"
and media influences on government decisions and planning are significant enough that they should cause military
professionals and their civilian counterparts to expect and prepare for these media effects in military operations. To
base such preparations on the limited perspectives provided by the media spirals into diminishing returns, but as Peres
noted, to ignore those same perspectives can be very dangerous. To make effective preparations for the "CNN effect,"
the military must recall that, rich and diverse as the media may be, the cleavages and facets of media stories are sharp,
simple, broad, and few. We must describe the tapestry of plans and operations honestly, so that the media will have to
explain any refusal on its part to provide that which soldiers and diplomats offered willingly to the American people.
History's Ironies: Back to the Future
History does not repeat itself; it repeats its ironies. Following the Civil War, America's Army, the smallest it had been
since the Revolution, was relegated to "peacekeeping" in ethnic conflicts on our Western frontier. It became a
"professional police force refereeing disputes between cattle and sheep ranchers . . . and protecting settlers from
resentful bands" of Indians; their countrymen "seldom looked beyond the Mississippi to hear the ominous sounds of
massacre and depredation that the troops were trying vainly to suppress."[21] Those were difficult, unappreciated
missions. One-quarter of the Army, for example, over 5000 soldiers, took many months to bring Geronimo and a
handful of Apache warriors to ground on the reservation. The Army was widely vilified for not hanging him on the
spot. US soldiers enforced federal treaties and kept peace on the frontier as often by protecting Indians from whites
bent on ethnic cleansing as by operations against the native Americans.[22]
The legacy of the last half of the 19th century was to be profound in the first half of the next. Many of our great
captains in the World Wars took their first steps in the frontier posts of those Indian-fighters.[23] Historian Russell
Weigley partly attributes the Army's safe, conservative tactics in the first half of the 20th century--its failures in war to
take advantage of superior mass, mobility, and firepower--to its long, 19th-century frontier constabulary history.[24]
Similarly, the Army's legacies of World War II and subsequent nation-state conflicts depend heavily on technology for
combat training, air-ground joint tactics, and operations planning. That culture leaves the Army unready
psychologically for policing the ethnic conflicts of the 21st century, and unprepared organizationally to return to a
future as a "professional police force refereeing disputes" between 21st-century cattle and sheep ranchers and warring
tribes.
The revolutionary collisions of sociopolitical forces will determine future conflicts, their nature, and the motivations of
the belligerents, as well as our perceptions and reactions to them. These deep forces shake military affairs. Today's
military professionals must anticipate those shocks and adapt their structures and technologies to function effectively
despite their consequences. The military must function within the social movements identified here, channeling the
interaction of military operations with these sociopolitical forces to move us closer to our military objectives and
toward our nation's political strategies and democratic goals. Our revolution in military affairs should encompass and
adapt to these forces. If we are truly moving back to the future, our failure to adapt can create the risk of reliving
history's ironies. The Army could find itself standing its ground without realizing that the ground has shifted beneath it,
causing others to see us dancing a ludicrous and dangerous ballet.
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